TRADING INTELLIGENCE Research and Advisory Services Division




23 May 2024

What is OPEC+ going to do in June (and the rest of this year)? It will be an important issue for us in bunkers!

Bunker prices are at their lowest for three months


Although VLSFO has been in a relatively narrow price range, prices are now at their lowest for more than 3 months. The sharp drop in oil prices at the start of this month has meant Singapore and Fujairah VLSFO prices are down by \$20/mt since end April, with Rotterdam VLSFO down by \$30/mt.

General concerns about future economic growth, a perceived greater chance of a truce in the Israel/ Gaza conflict, weaker oil demand (especially in Europe) and rising oil stock levels have all contributed to this bearish sentiment and led prices down.



Lower crude prices mean OPEC+ has tough decisions to take

The drop in crude prices has meant Brent has fallen from \$90+ levels, back down to the low \$80s, and is why OPEC+ is facing a significant dilemma at their upcoming June 1st meeting.




The big questions for OPEC+ surround their production cutbacks, where there are three key aspects:

- First, the main cutbacks from all OPEC+ countries that amount to around 3.7 million b/d. These have been extended a number of times and are now scheduled to run until the end of this year, and so perhaps will not be a primary focus just yet.
- The main issue now surrounds a limited number of OPEC+ countries that have made additional voluntary cutbacks totalling 2.2 million b/d. These were implemented in July 2023 and have been extended through to the end of the second quarter this year.
- Finally, the extent of continued over-production by some countries. In April, the main 'overproducers' were Iraq (at 0.24 million b/d), UAE (0.24 million b/d), Kazakhstan (0.13 million b/d) and Russia (0.20 million b/d)
- The immediate dilemma for OPEC+ is: what do those countries making the additional voluntary cutbacks do? The quote from OPEC in early March was that from end June "these voluntary cuts will be returned gradually subject to market conditions". Will they do this?

Which countries are we talking about?

Of the eight countries involved in the additional 2.2 million b/d cutbacks, Saudi Arabia is by far the biggest, and most likely to drive the decision to extend or unwind this part of the agreement.




On paper, Russia also has a significant role, but this is 'clouded' by the fact that the crude cutbacks are split between production for the domestic market and those for export. It is only the export volumes that matter to the fundamentals and sentiment in international oil markets.

Not all eight countries will have an impact

Outside of Saudi Arabia, and possibly Russia, there may be little impact from the unwinding this 'additional' agreement. Even if it does go ahead, it is possible that there will be very little (if any) change in production from six of the eight member countries involved. The reasoning here is that in the broader OPEC+ agreement covering all countries, the four members that are producing substantially more than their allocation (Iraq, UAE, Kazakhstan, and Russia) are also included in the eight members that make up this additional 2.2 million b/d cutback.

The graph below illustrates the extent of over-production versus the agreed additional cutbacks made by each of the eight countries involved.



For instance, Iraq is currently producing around 0.19 million b/d more than its 4.00 million b/d allocation. If the additional cutbacks are removed, then Iraq's new allocation will rise to 4.22 million b/d. This is virtually in-line with their current production. So, for Iraq, it could be that they just maintain current production levels as the additional cutbacks are unwound. This would mean they automatically fall into line as a 'good' member, adhering to their new, higher allocation; AND there will be no increases in world oil supply!

It is exactly the same for UAE and Kazakhstan; their output levels can just continue at current levels, and they will also 'fall into line' with their new allocation as the additional cutbacks are unwound.

After this, Algeria and Oman are relatively small players in volume terms, and so will have limited impact. It does mean that Saudi Arabia and Russia will be the main protagonists.

So, what will happen if the additional cutbacks are unwound in Q3?

Based on the scenario above, which is credible, if the additional cuts are removed then Saudi Arabia is highly likely to ramp up production by 1 million b/d, and Kuwait potentially by 0.1 million b/d.

That then leaves Russia, which is highly uncertain given it may not have capacity to raise output, and if it has, whether this would go to their domestic market, or into the international market.

The table below indicates what the agreed additional cutbacks are, compared with the latest levels of over-production. Assuming the agreement is unwound and each country abides by its new production allocation, the final column shows the potential gain in oil supply.

	Agreed Additional Cutbacks	Over-production (April 2024)	Potential Increase in Supply*
Saudi Arabia	1.00	0.03	0.97
Iraq	0.22	0.19	0.03
UAE	0.16	0.13	0.03
Kuwait	0.14	0.04	0.10
Kazakhstan	0.08	0.10	=
Algeria	0.05	0.00	0.05
Oman	0.04	0.00	0.04
Russia	0.47	0.20	0.27
TOTAL:	2.16	0.69	1.49

Either way, it looks like a removal of the additional OPEC+ cuts would result in an extra 1.0-1.2 million b/d to world oil supply (outside of Russia), and not the full 2.2 million b/d headline figure.

What signal would an 'unwinding' send to the market?

The IEA and the US EIA put the call on OPEC+ remaining more-or less flat through the rest of this year, and also flat to a potential slight decline next year (highlighted in our report April 24th). This implies any unwinding of the OPEC+ additional cuts would be a bearish signal to the market this year (and even in 2025!).

integr8fuels.com

However, market analysis by OPEC contradicts this, and shows a much stronger growth in oil demand for 2024 and 2025 than other organisations. In their latest report, OPEC indicates the call on OPEC+ increasing by around 0.8 million b/d over the remainder of this year, and another 0.9 million b/d between end 2024 and end 2025. On their basis there is room for OPEC+ to start unwinding the additional cutbacks from end June and there would be only a small material change to the fundamental oil balance.

It is likely to come down to Saudi policy

Although an announcement could be made at any time, the market focus will be on the run-up to the June 1st OPEC+ meeting.

If the group decides to extend the additional cuts again, then this is more likely to be seen 'price neutral'.

For most, an unwinding is likely to be seen as a bearish signal. In this case, bunker prices would fall. There are also further implications for us in bunkers, as almost all the crude supply gains would be heavy/sour grades from the Middle East, and so have a potential impact on the VLSFO/HSFO spread.

Is there a 'curved ball', where OPEC+ make more cuts? We can only keep an eye on OPEC+ and Saudi Arabia ahead of the June meeting (and for the rest of this year and next!).



Steve Christy Expert Contributor <u>steve.christy@integ</u>r8fuels.com

DISCLAIMER This report has been prepared by, and the opinions expressed are those of, Integr8 Fuels as of the date of writing (the "Materials") and are subject to change without notice. Integr8 Fuels does not undertake to update or revise the Materials. The Materials are intended to provide general and preliminary information, and is not intended to be relied upon, and must not be read, as financial, legal, business, investment, accounting, tax or other advice or guidance. The Materials are also not addressed to, and do not contemplate, the individual circumstances of any person, including without limitation its financial condition, business environment, investment knowledge and experience, objectives, investment horizon, risk tolerance and preferences. Each person must independently evaluate information contained in the Materials, and form its own opinion and/or seek professional advice, as to the course of conduct most appropriate to it. Save for this disclaimer, the Materials are not intended to create legally binding relations. The Materials further do not constitute an offer or invitation to any person to trade with, invest in, provide finance to or take any other position with respect to Integr8 Fuels, any of its affiliates or any other person. In preparing the Materials, Integr8 Fuels has acted on its own behalf and must not be regarded as agent or representative of any other person. The information in the Materials is given in good faith but without guarantee, and notwithstanding anything to the contrary Integr8 Fuels makes no representation as to its accuracy, completeness, authenticity or source. To the fullest extent permitted by applicable law, Integr8 Fuels shall have no liability in contract, tort (including negligence) or otherwise for any direct, indirect, incidental, special, punitive or consequential damages or losses, including but not limited to loss of profits, revenue, business, opportunity, goodwill, reputation or business interruption, that result in any way from the use of content provided in the Materials. The Materials may not be used, copied, reproduced, disseminated, quoted or referred to in any publication, presentation or other document (with or without attribution to Integr8 Fuels) at any time or in any manner without the express, prior written consent of Integr8 Fuels. Integr8 Fuels consists of Integr8 Fuels Holding Inc of Trust Company Complex Ajeltake Road Ajeltake Island, Majuro Marshall Islands MH 96960 and all of its subsidiaries

